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The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts
LAUREN K. ROBEL*
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990' is not exciting legislation.
It does not allocate resources to B-1 bombers, commit our troops to
foreign soil, nor promise to educate our youth. As enacted, it requires
only that most federal trial courts consider the appropriateness of certain
case management techniques.2 Yet it became the focus of an intense and
acrimonious debate between federal judges - usually among the most
politically reticent of government employees - and a powerful senator,
Joseph Biden. The story of the passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act is
more than an interesting tale of interbranch wrangling over powers and
responsibilities. Rather, it is a paradigm of the function of crisis rhetoric
in legislative court reform efforts.
The Civil Justice Reform Act was based on the recommendations
contained in a report, Justice for All, that in turn used the existence of a
crisis in the federal courts to justify its call for legislation 3 Crisis
rhetoric is enduringly popular in discussions of the court system.4 In
addition to the task force report, the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee, issued last year, relies to some extent on the existence of a
crisis in the federal courts to support its calls for court reform.' While
both use claims of court crisis to argue for legislation, the reports do not
agree about the nature of that crisis, nor do they account for, or even
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1. Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 (1990)
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. For fuller description of the legislation, see infra part I.B.
3. THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN
CIVIL LITIGATION (1989) [hereinafter REPORT].
4. Marc Galanter has been a dogged chronicler of the crisis rhetoric in some of its
incarnations. See Mare Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (the *crisis" of overlitigation); Marc Galanter, The Day Afier
the Litigation Erplosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 (1986) (the "crisis" of overlitigation).
5. THE REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990) [hereinafter
FCSC]. The FCSC report also spawned legislation in the Federal Courts Study Committee
Implementation Act, Title III of The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 11, 9, 18 and 28 U.S.C.). The FCSC
report has not yet had the legislative success of the task force report; Title I enacts only
the "noncontroversial recommendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee." 136
CONG. REC. H8262 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier); 136 CONG.
REC. S17578 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (remarks of Sen. Grassley).
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acknowledge, available evidence demonstrating that the federal courts'
performance is strong and remains stable over time.6
I argue below that claims about the existence of a court crisis
which threatens access to the federal courts provide their proponents with
a public-interest justification for court reform. The public reliance on the
court system is particularly strong, and policy disputes about the courts,
when they take the form, for instance, of debates about jurisdiction, are
surrounded by powerful ideological forces.7 Claims that the federal court
system faces a crisis that requires participants in such debates to pull with
a common oar become tempting as a way of circumventing predictable
political controversy. Such claims should, therefore, be closely
scrutinized to determine whether they disguise a more familiar, and
controversial, political agenda.
Does either study make the case for the existence of crisis?
Interestingly, neither really makes the attempt. Both reports use crisis
rhetoric, instead, to justify a more controversial vision of the way the
procedural or judicial resources of the federal courts should be allocated.
Justice for All recommends a series of procedural requirements that, at
bottom, is premised on a fundamental disagreement with policies inherent
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, on the other hand, presents a brief for the
artificial limitation of federal court capacity to provide adjudication.
In this essay, I critically discuss the reports' use of court crisis
rhetoric and the evidence they marshal in support of crisis claims. With
respect to both reports, I ask, "Whose crisis is being narrated, and to
what effect?"
6. See TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF
CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990); WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL
SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS (1990).
7. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, he Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1141 (1988); Michael Wells, The Impact of Substantive Interests on the Law of Federal
Courts, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 499 (1989).
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I. JUSTICE FOR ALL
A. The Crisis Part I: Delay and Cost
The Civil Justice Reform Act, as initially introduced, tracked
completely the recommendations of a report entitled Justice for All.' The
report is the product of a task force convened at the Brookings Institution
at the behest of Senator Joseph Biden, Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, to address delay and cost in the federal trial courts.9
Described by Senator Biden as a meeting of "people of historically
divergent and powerfully stated views,"' ° the task force was in fact
dominated by past or present corporate counsel, which constituted a
quarter of its membership." None of the task force members were on the
federal bench, although former federal judges participated.
The task force report rests on two firm assumptions. First, the
federal trial courts are in a crisis that has as its primary symptoms
unacceptable delays in processing civil cases, and unacceptably high costs
in civil litigation generally.2 Second, these problems are attributable to a
lack of will on the part of the systems' players - the judges and lawyers
who presumably control the pace of litigation. The first of these
assumptions is explicit, the second implicit in the form of the report's
recommendations, which are concerned primarily either with mandating
new behavior, or with adjusting incentives to modify the behavior of
lawyers and judges.'
While neither assumption is startling, both are controversial. 4 The
extent of, indeed the existence of, a crisis in civil litigation in the federal
8. REPORT, supra note 3.
9. Id. at vii. See also Robert Banks, The Need for Reform, 74 JUDICATURE 113 (1990)
(discussing Senator Biden's role); Marcia Coyle, Senate Sets Its Sights on Delay in Civil
Trials, NAT'L. L. J., July 23, 1990, at 5 (noting that Senator Biden was honorary chair of
the Foundation for Change, the organization that conducted the opinion poll which underlies
the task force report).
10. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990:
Hearings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Hr'g 1097,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings].
11. The effect of such a strong corporate presence will be discussed, infra. The task
force also included representatives from consumer, environmental and civil rights groups and
law professors. REPORT, supra note 3, at vii.
12. Id. at 1 (civil litigation "costs too much and takes too long").
13. While some of the report's recommendations are aimed at litigants, see id. at
36-37, these constitute such a tiny fraction of the recommendations that they clearly seem to
be an afterthought.
14. I have previously addressed judges' own complaints about caseload pressures. See
Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 3 (1990).
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trial courts is itself a hotly debated proposition. s Thus, a crisis premised
on excessive delay and cost cannot simply be asserted; rather, it must be
demonstrated.16
For example, consider the reports' claims of excessive delays in
federal trial courts. 17 The median time from filing to disposition for most
federal civil cases is eight months, not a particularly alarming figure."'
The longest median time for any single category of cases in 1989 was 15
months (for antitrust suits).19 If median times seem a less than acceptable
measure of dispute resolution time, then consider that in 1986, 61% of all
federal cases reached disposition within one year of filing." Are the
federal trial courts deteriorating over time? Hardly: the comparable one-
year disposition time in 1971 was 60%.21
This information about the state of the federal trial courts is
contained in the most thorough empirical study of federal civil cases ever
conducted. The study, issued by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice,
found that disposition times for federal civil cases remained "remarkably
stable during the 1970's and 1980's despite a substantial increase in
caseload during that period."" In addition, "the termination rate has
remained proportionate to the filing rate, indicating that the district courts
have kept pace with the filing increases that have occurred. " 23 Thus,
while it may be possible to show, as the task force report asserts, that "in
15. Although not debated by Aetna Life and Casualty Foundation, one of the financial
supporters of the report, see REPORT, supra note 3, at viii. Aetna has for years been telling
us that "America's civil liability system has gone berserk. . . .[I]t is no longer fair. It's no
longer efficient. And it's no longer predictable." Aetna advertisement, WALL ST. J., April
8, 1989, at 9, quoted in Marc Galanter, The Day After The Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
REV. 3, 4 (1986). Indeed, it is only the effect in some federal trial districts of the criminal
docket, which the task force ignores, that makes the appellation "crisis" p.ausible for federal
trial courts. See infra notes 66-68.
16. See, e.g., Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
123 (1983) (questioning whether litigations' costs are excessive); DUNGWO,,TH & PACE,
supra note 6 (evaluation of civil docket over time reveals stability in processing time).
17. REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-7.
18. L. RALPH MECHAM, THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 10 (1989). This median excludes land
condemnation cases, prisoner petitions, and deportation reviews. Id.
19. Id.
20. DUNGWORTH & PACE, supra note 6, at viii.
21. Id. The percentages are similarly stable for other across-time distributions: in
1971, "22% [were terminated] within 2 years, 10% within 3 years, and 8% later than that.
In 1986, comparable percentages were 23%, 9% and 7%, respectively." Id.
22. Id. at vii.
23. Id. at vii-viii. While this study covered the period from 1970-86, the "trends
identified hold true in more recent years." Rand Studies Civil Workload of Courts, THIRD
BRANCH, Aug. 1990, at 5. See also HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 6, at 130-31
(1990) (reporting that civil case terminations per judge reached an all-time high in 1988 and
that judges have kept pace with backlog of pending cases and new filings).
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many courts litigants must wait for years to resolve their disputes, "24 it
would be hard to demonstrate that this was the ordinary state of affairs.
Moreover, even the existence of some "slow" courts hardly justifies the
task force's call for national legislation.
Further, the report implicitly asserts that we know "delay" when
we see it. This leads to confidence that appropriate deadlines can be set
for whole categories of cases, despite a lack of data about how long a
case "should" take from filing to termination. Without such data, it is
difficult to differentiate between "delay" and appropriate case
development.Z' Thus, the report does not discuss the possibility that
decreasing processing time would lead to less considered, or even
incorrect, decisions, or foreclosure of claims on grounds other than their
merit.
The report is no more forthcoming about its determination that
litigation costs are excessive. It does not distinguish between costs to the
courts, the public, or the litigants. However, we may assume that it is
costs to litigants with which the report is especially concerned, for it
identifies discovery abuse as the primary culprit of excessive costs.'
While claims of widespread "abuse" of discovery tools are initially more
intuitively appealing than claims of widespread delays, the discovery abuse
issue is again problematic. Discovery is the subject of a thousand
anecdotes, but there are empirical studies demonstrating that discovery is
not a serious problem in most cases in federal court.2 Rather than
presenting even a minimal demonstration that the existence of rampant
discovery abuse is a widespread problem demanding a nationwide
solution, the report takes its existence as given.
The lack of support for the task force's call for new discovery
controls is especially surprising when one considers that discovery abuse
was the subject of a nationwide initiative as recently as 1983, when the
24. REPORT, stupra note 3, at 1. No support is provided for this statement, however.
Some courts are slow. DUNGWORTH & PACE, supra note 6, at 39-42. But the Rand study,
supra note 23, demonstrates that these are the exception, not the rule.
25. See Mary Lee Luskin, Building a Theory of Case Processing 7ime, 62 JUDICATURE
114, 116 (1978).
26. E.g., REPORT, supra note 3, at 1 (cases "overdiscovered," attorneys "pursue ever
more expensive means of discovery"); id. at 6 ("most important cause of high litigation costs
or delays is abuse by attorneys of the discovery process, which leads to 'overdiscovery' of
cases rather than to attempts to focus on controlling issues"); id. at 19 (discovery process is
"out of control").
27. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under
the New Federal Rules. On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 680,
696-98 (1983) (quoting Federal Judicial Center Study that concluded that "no discovery
requests were filed in 50% of all cases [filed in federal court], and only 5% of all cases
contained 10 or more discovery initiatives"); Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse?, 69
B.U. L. REv. 649 (1989).
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federal civil rules were amended with exactly this issue in mind.' A
claim that yet another nationwide initiative in this area is needed requires
more substantial justification than the report provides."
The authors of the report recognize that court cost and delay have
been the object of any number of studies in recent years,a and so they
make no claim that the recommendations they advance are new; rather,
the report's claim to value comes from the consensus arrived at by the
participants in the task force's discussions.31  Because, the authors argue,
the task force is comprised of people with ideologically diverse views and
because the report makes only those policy recommendations for which
there was broad agreement, it represents a workable, politically palatable,
noncontroversial solution to the problems presented by the civil docket in
federal trial courts. 32
The report is a slim 39 pages. The emphasis on agreement and
broad support, while clearly viewed as politically imperative for the
legislative effort this report presaged, makes the report itself unsatisfying:
there is too much consensus here and not enough evidence. Little
attention is paid to the empirical basis for the report's recommendations.
In keeping with its general tenor as a consensus document, the report has
as its primary empirical source an opinion poll that asked 1000 judges,
28. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 16(b) (mandating scheduling orders that limit the time
for completing discovery or filing and hearing motions and requiring a showing of good
cause for modification of these scheduling orders); FED. R. CIv. P. 26(g) (sanctioning
attorneys who certify discovery requests that are "unreasonable or unduly burdensome" or
"interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or
needless increase in the cost of litigation."). See generally, A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE
CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984).
29. The report notes that amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in both
1980 and 1983 were intended to control discovery. The report simply states,
"[u]nfortunately, these well-intentioned amendments have not adequately regulated the
discovery process." REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
30. Roscoe Pound identified delay and cost as among the causes of "popular
dissatisfaction" with the law in 1906. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395, 408 (1906) (decrying "[u]ncertainty,
delay and expense, and above all the injustice of deciding cases on points of practice.) See
also THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin
and Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). Serious empirical studies of delay in civil cases date at
least from HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT (1959). In recent years, reports and
studies include BARRY MAHONEY Er AL., CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS: CAEFLOW
MANAGEMENT AND DELAY REDUCTION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1988); AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY (1984); THOMAS CHURCH Er
AL., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978).
31. REPORT, supra note 3, at 2.
32. Id. at 2-3.
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litigators, and corporate counsel their opinions about cost and delay.s!
Unsurprisingly, no one favors them.34
The poll results, however, might have led to some rethinking about
the definition of the problem. In answer to a preliminary question about
the respondents' view of how "the process of civil litigation works in the
federal courts," the overwhelming majority in every category responded
"very well" or "somewhat well. "3s Similarly, when asked to volunteer
their "most serious criticism . . . of the process of civil litigation in the
Federal Courts today," relatively small percentages of respondents cited
"costs/cost of litigation. "6 While "delays/too slow in reaching court" was
the most frequent response, it too accounted for relatively small
percentages of answers.'
More fundamentally, however, the relationship between reducing
delay and cost, and increasing access to justice, the purported goal of the
task force, 3' is problematic. As George Priest has convincingly
demonstrated, the effects of reform efforts keyed toward reducing delay
are limited by what he phrases the "congestion equilibrium."39 Reducing
delay does not have the effect of simply making the existing cases in the
civil system move more quickly; rather, delay-reduction reforms have
more subtle systemic consequences. Several commentators have argued
that the probable effect of reducing delay and cost in civil litigation is to
encourage more filings. Priest has argued' that reforms that speed things
up produce a "shift from settlement to trial," not an ultimate reduction in
33. See Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1989) reprinted in Hearings, supra note 10, at 94-184.
34. Id. The poll "focused on perceptions and attitudes about whether increasing
litigation transaction costs and delays in the federal civil justice system are a problem, and,
if so, to assess the magnitude of the problem, its probable causes, and a broad range of
possible solutions." Id. at i.
35. The totals were: 91% of the private defense respondents, 96% of the plaintiffs'
litigators, 86% of the public interest litigators, 80% of the corporate counsel, and 95% of
the federal judges. As was consistently true of the survey responses, corporate counsel are
the most dissatisfied with the workings of the system. Id. at 6.
36. The highest percentage, 15% was federal judges. The other results were: private
defense, 11%; plaintiffs' litigators, 12%; public interest litigators, 12%; corporate counsel,
12%. Id. at 11.
37. Public interest litigators cited delay most frequently (35%); federal judges were the
least concerned (14%). Id.
38. REPORT, supra note 3, at 6 ("High transaction costs - manifested in high out-of-
pocket legal fees and the time consumed by delay - are the enemies of justice.*).
39. George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.. L.
REV. 527, 558 (1989); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Thoughts on the Equilibrium Hypothesis,
69 B.U. L. REV. 561 (1989) (expanding Priest's model).
40. Priest supported his model with empirical evidence from the delay reduction
programs implemented in Cook County, Illinois. Priest, supra note 39, at 544-56.
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delay. 41 While no one favors delay, "where it is acknowledged that delay
is inevitable... consensus disappears."2
Even if one accepts that the current state of affairs is not optimal,
one gets little sense from the report that it might have more complex
causes than lack of discipline on the part of attorneys, clients, and judges.
The report repeatedly attributes cost and delay to a failure of will on the
part of attorneys and judges.' There is empirical support for the belief
that the "local legal culture" - the expectations of the actors in the
system - is a strong influence on the pace of litigation." But this
knowledge does not translate quite as easily into the policy
recommendations suggested by the report as one might imagine. The
hypothesis of the effect of a "local legal culture" on litigation pace is
associated with the work of the National Center for State Courts, which
has studied the phenomenon of court delay extensively. Most recently, in
an ambitious study, the Center has concluded that many reform measures
fail because they affect only superficially the underlying determinants of
the "local legal culture."" This observation, however, tells us nothing
about "the characteristics of low-delay cultures" nor does it suggest "how
such cultural norms can be transported from one jurisdiction to another."46
The report's recommendations must rest, then, on the belief that
mandating new behavior will pull the system into line, notwithstanding
41. Id. at 558.
42. Id.
43. REPORT, supra note 3. For example, mandatory time limits are necessary to "alter
the inertia of the system and give parties and judges strong incentives to move cases along
quickly to disposition." Id. at 11. And information about how long cases have been
pending on judges' dockets should be made public. Id. at 27 ("substantially expanding the
availability of public information about caseloads by judge [sic] will encourage judges with
significant backlogs in undecided motions and cases to resolve those matters and to move
their cases along more quickly.").
44. See, e.g., Thomas W. Church, Jr., Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JUST.
SYS. J. 166, 181-82 (1978) (speed of disposition of civil cases is "result of a stable set of
expectations, practices and informal rules of behavior which . . . [Church calls] 'local legal
culture'"). See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, MANAGING TO REDUCE
DELAY 13 (1980); MAHONEY, supra note 30, at 87-89.
45. MAHONEY, supra note 30. Further, the study found no correlation between
adoption of settlement methods (such as alternative dispute resolution), calendaring methods,
or automized dockets, and speed of disposition. Id. at 84-89, 192-97. The study found that
some jurisdictions which practiced aggressive case management had low delay levels. But as
Priest has noted, "the clearly unsystematic character of the relationship suggests a
troublesome issue of causation: Does strict case management actually reduce delay or is
strict case management only feasible in jurisdictions without overwhelming backlogs?"
Priest, supra note 39, at 530.
46. Priest, supra note 39, at 530. See also DUNGWORTH & PACE, supra note 6, at x-
xi (detailed study of federal courts unable to answer question "why are the slow . . .
districts slow and the fast districts fast?").
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any of a number of external restraints, such as the underlying economics
of law practice,' or the vicissitudes of the criminal docket.
Accepting the report's initial premises, how does the task force
recommend that these problems be addressed? While its recommendations
are divided into three categories, the report's focus is on changes in
procedures.'
The central recommendation is that every federal trial court be
statutorily required to develop a "Civil Justice Reform Plan."' The
remainder of the procedural recommendations center on the plans'
contents. First, the report favors assigning cases to tracking systems
based on an initial early assessment of the case's complexity s  and
following that assignment with different procedures for different tracks.
Second, given the behavioristic assumptions of the report, the core
recommendations for plan content involve the imposition of deadlines for
attorneys and judges. The mandatory content of the plans, then, includes
deadlines for trial,51 for completion of discovery, and for decisions on
motions n These deadlines would vary according to how a case was
"tracked," and would be subject to only a narrow, "good cause"
exception.m Finally, the report relies heavily on case management
through active judicial involvement in the pretrial phase, ss and favors
displacing magistrates from their current involvement in pretrial case
management.m In keeping with its emphasis on disposing of cases at the
47. See Earl Johnson, Jr., Lawyer's Choices: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation
Investment Decisions, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 567 (1980) (evaluating litigation decisions
through economic analysis of fee payment method); HERBERT M. KRrTzER, THE JUsTIcE
BROKER: LAWYERS AND ORDINARY LITIGATION 117-21 (1990) (empirical analysis of effects
of fee arrangements on lawyer effort).
48. The report also makes recommendations for expanding judicial resources, and
recommendations for clients and their attorneys. REPORT, supra note 3.
49. Id. at 12. The plan would be developed with the assistance of an advisory group
made up of representatives of the bar and the public. Id. While the report states that it
advocates a "bottom up" approach, with Congress mandating only the core of the plans and
individual courts filling in the details, id. at 11, the recommendations are sufficiently
detailed to act as a significant restraint on local autonomy.
50. Id. at 11, see also pp. 14-17.
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id. at 19.
53. Id. at 22 (recommending standard times for decisions on motions); see also pp. 11,
16-22.
54. Id. at 21-22.
55. Id. at 23-25.
56. Id. at 28. This recommendation is extremely puzzling, and seems almost offhand.
The report recognizes the alarms raised by commentators about extensive pretrial
involvement by judges who might later be required to try the case on the merits. E.g.,
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). Using magistrates to
supervise pretrial could avoid some of the issues raised by judicial involvement in the
pretrial period. Recent work has indicated that one variable that actually correlates
positively with reduced delay on both the civil and criminal side is the contribution of
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earliest possible moment, the report also recommends institution of "early
neutral evaluation" procedures. s
The report contains recommendations for expanding judicial
resources by increasing administrative support, filling judicial vacancies,
and increasing judges' salaries. In keeping with its emphasis on strong
judicial management of cases, it also suggests expanded judicial case
management training programs ss In addition, it contains an abbreviated
section entitled "Recommendations for Clients and Their Attorneys,"
which exhorts lawyers to restrain themselves and urges clients to control
their attorneys' excesses. 9 However, the heart of the report is clearly the
procedural reform section, and it is that section which deserves close
scrutiny.
In the report's view, most problems in the trial courts could be
solved by deadlines. But a small example demonstrates that the task
force's disinterest in the context in which civil litigation occurs renders
such optimism questionable. Perhaps the strongest of the deadline
recommendations is that the trial court be required to set "early, firm trial
dates. "6 The report correctly notes wide agreement among
commentators, judges and lawyers that setting firm trial dates would speed
case processing." For instance, an impressive 89% of the federal judges
surveyed in the Harris poll strongly supported setting firm trial dates.?
Given this consensus, one would suppose that the task force might
become curious about why the practice of setting firm trial dates had not
caught on, and it is here that the task force's emphasis on corporate
participants and the lack of federal judges clearly shows. The most
obvious answer has to do with the criminal docket, the effect of which on
civil litigation the report ignores entirely. The combined effects of the
Speedy Trial Act," which controls trial dates on the criminal side, the
federal sentencing guidelines,64 which many judges believe have led to
decreased incentives for plea bargaining and thus resulted in more
magistrates. HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 6, at 157.
57. REPORT, supra note 3, at 23-25.
58. Id. at 30-33.
59. Id. at 34-38.
60. Id. at 17.
61. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 44, at 12-13. The
report does not mention, however, that many commentators believe that setting firm trial
dates is the only managerial device that has been demonstrated to have an effect on case
processing time.
62. REPORT, supra note 3, at 19.
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976).
64. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, and 28 U.S.C. §§
991-998 (1982).
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criminal trials, 6s and the so-called "war on drugs," which has led to
increased criminal filings,"6 have been devastating for the civil dockets of
some trial courts.' Even where the effects are not devastating, they
certainly must be taken into account in any rational scheme that requires
firm civil trial dates as part of a mandatory management program." The
report, however, contains only one sentence about the criminal docket,
and that simply notes that the "processing of civil cases . . . is slowed by
rising numbers of criminal cases, which in effect must be given priority in
scheduling."o
Discovery deadlines are another area where some examination and
analysis of current practice in the federal courts might have been
informative. The report recommends that time guidelines for the
completion of discovery be tailored to each track.70  Following the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, most
federal courts adopted limits on discovery practice through their local
rules. 7' Several have, in fact, adopted explicit time frames for the
completion of discovery, notwithstanding the use of scheduling orders,72
65. See, e.g., Diane E. Murphy, S. 2648, The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: The
Concerns of Federal Judges, 74 JUDICATURE 112, 114 n.2 (1990) (noting that more criminal
defendants are going to trial because of the sentencing guidelines, which also require lengthy
collateral proceedings).
66. While federal civil caseloads decreased by 7% in 1990, criminal case filings grew
by 6%. That percentage increase is twice what it was in 1989. Cour's Caseload Continues
to Increase, THIRD BRANCH, Sept. 1990 at 1-3 (reporting on Report of Administrative
Director of the United States Courts). See Michael Tackett, Drug War Chokes Federal
Courts; Assembly Line Justice Imperils Legal System, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1990 (chronicling
effects of both drug caseload and sentencing guidelines on federal courts); W. John Moore,
Courting Disaster, 22 NAT'L J. 509 (1990) (rapidly rising number of drug cases, impact of
sentencing rules and Speedy Trial Act threatening to bury federal court system).
67. See, for example, Middle District of Florida Suspends Civil Trials, THIRD BRANCH,
Feb. 1991, at 9. See also Ann Pelham, Biden Plan Puts the Spurs to Federal Judges, TEX.
LAW., Mar. 12, 1990, at 9 (quoting Chief Judge Lucius Bunton, Western District of Texas
"If I don't get more judges in the next two to three years [to help with drug cases], we'll
just have to say adios to civil cases.").
68. One federal trial judge commented that the initial legislation premised on the report,
which ignores the effects of the criminal docket, "indicates . . . a lack of understanding of
what life is like in the federal courts today." Pelham, supra note 67.
69. REPORT, supra note 3, at 9-10.
70. Id. at 19. The report suggests that an "expedited" track might have a guideline of
50-100 days, a "standard" track allow 100-200 days, and a "complex" track allow 6-18
months. Id.
71. For instance, courts in 51 districts place numerical limits on the certain kinds of
discovery, such as interrogatories. (List of rules on file with author.) In addition, most
courts use the provisions of FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b) to establish discovery completion dates.
Id.
72. E.g., Kansas (4 months); Mississippi (6 months). Id.
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or have some form of tracking already in place.7 The time frames vary
widely from court to court, making it possible to study what effect these
deadlines and time frames have.74
To the extent discovery constraints limit the resources available for
claim development, they may have clear substantive effects, as the
participants in the task force are aware. 7s Time limits, especially if
coupled with the limits on allowable discovery devices already in place in
many federal trial courts, implicitly require lawyers to reject some
avenues of claim development in response to scarcity of procedural
moves. 76 Such effects are especially likely under the regime the report
contemplates, because it advocates a particularly narrow form of "staged"
discovery, in which initial discovery is limited to "inspecting a few
documents and taking a few depositions" in order to provide just that
quantum of discovery necessary to make a "realistic assessment" of the
case.
77
Discovery limitations, in fact, seem to be the engine powering
many of the recommendations. In discussing the case tracking
requirements, for instance, the report states (without further comment)
that "[flor many cases the large-scale discovery methods available under
the rules are simply unnecessary."" (The report does not suggest which
of the discovery methods are "unnecessary" or how the tracking plans will
make this determination, or even that attorneys now choose these "large-
scale" discovery methods in small-scale disputes.)
Similarly, the purpose of tracking is to set early trial dates and
"impos[e] time limits on the discovery process, directed toward
completion of discovery, with related limits on the resolution of
motions.""' Setting firm trial dates, in turn, requires attorneys to make
choices about investigation through discovery. While the report quotes
approvingly from an article by Professor Donald Elliott about the practice
73. For instance, some courts require discovery to be completed in cases exempt from
scheduling orders under FED. R. CIV. P. 16 within certain timeframes. See, e.g., Northern
District of Georgia (4 months after answer filed); Western District of North Carolina (90
days). Id.
74. The Federal Judicial Center has done some study in this area. See, e.g., CAROLL
SERON, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE USE OF STANDARD PRETRIAL PROCEDURES: AN
ASSESSMENT OF LOCAL RULE 235 OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA (1986).
75. The report cites, and even quotes, several articles that make the point about the
connection between discovery limits and issue foreclosure. REPORT, supra note 3, at 18
(quoting E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 306, 313 (1986)); id. at 24 (citing Resnik, supra note 56).
76. See Robel, supra note 14, at 14-15.
77. REPORT, supra note 3, at 20.
78. Id. at 14.
79. Id. at 15.
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of setting such dates,"0 it fails to read the sentences following its
quotation:
When a managerially-minded judge limits discovery to certain
issues or selects a trial date only a few months away, the judge
forecloses the development of issues. Sometimes the actions of
the managerial judge determine directly which issues are
foreclosed; more often, the judge's action forces counsel to make
that decision. But in either case, issues are foreclosed."
In the vast majority of cases, where little or no discovery occurs,
such discovery limits are not likely to have much effect one way or the
other (although other time limits, if severe enough, may still lead to claim
foreclosure through restricting the time available to construct the case), 2
Regardless, from the point of view of corporate defendants, as is clear
from the hearings on the legislation, discovery limitations are a second-
best alternative to the abolition of discovery altogether.a The obsession
with shortening the periods in which attorneys and judges do their work
(even shortening the time for service of process!)P and embarrassing
judges who take their time is not a simple desire to see the trains run on
time. Rather, it is a calculated strategy to foreclose claims at earlier and
earlier stages of the proceedings.
I have been taking the report's claims to desire reductions in cost
and delay at face value, however. Given the stature of the task-force
participants, the report's failings as a piece of serious scholarship about
the courts suggest that this was a document meant primarily for political
80. Id. at 18.
81. Elliott, supra note 75, at 315. Elliott's article is a thoughtful discussion of many of
the criticisms of this sort of claim preclusion.
82. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989)
(arguing that the threat of discovery changes the terms of settlements in ways unrelated to
the parties' legal entitlements, and that the terms of settlement are affected most when parties
threaten discovery, but never use it).
83. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 10, at 384 (testimony of Carl D. Liggio on behalf
of the Corporate Counsel Association) ("[Tihe Bill does not cure the root problem, but only
affords some possible relief. . . . The root problem is the fact that with the advent of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we adopted a policy of wide open discovery."); id. at 14
(statement of Patrick Head, Vice President and General Counsel of FMC Corporation) ("I
see little in the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] that on balance helps defendants," quoting
Geoffrey Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2242 (1989)).
84. REPORT, supra note 3, at 27 (recommending shortening service of process period
from 120 to 60 days in order to "accelerate the scheduling of initial alternative dispute
resolution and mandatory status conferences"). There is no demonstration in the report that
the length of the service of process period has any effect on anything, and the author of this
article has never even heard anecdotes about problems in civil case processing arising from
the length of the service period.
85. Id. (recommending that judges' caseload statistics be published).
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consumption. It is appropriate to ask, then, whose political agenda is
being advanced?
B. Whose Crisis?
When Senator Biden introduced legislation (which became known
as the "Biden Bill") adopting the report's recommendations, federal judges
promptly attacked the legislation, accusing Biden of attempting to
"micromanage" the federal courts and circumvent the ordinary rulemaking
process." Eventually, the legislation was denounced by the Judicial
Conference,8 and both the American Bar Association's Board of
Governors and the Federal Bar Association. 9  Even after extensive
negotiations between Senator Biden's staff and the Judicial Conference
(which attempted to preempt the legislation by voluntarily adopting some
of its proposals),'1 the Conference ultimately announced a position
disfavoring the bill.'
Nonetheless, the Civil Justice Reform Act as enacted contains most
of the recommendations of the report.' With the help of an advisory
group, every district is required to implement a "civil justice expense and
delay reduction plan." 93  Judges managed to forestall the mandatory
adoption of most of the task force's delay and cost reduction ideas, but
each district is required to go through the process of considering each of
the recommendations, including tracking, deadlines for discovery, trial,
86. S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
87. Ann Pelham, Biden, Judges Negotiate Civil Reform, LEGAL TIMES, May 14, 1990,
at 7; Ann Pelham, Shall v. May; Judges Rebel Over One Word in Civil Reform Bill, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 15, 1990, at 6.
88. The Judicial Conference is the management and policy arm of the federal judicial
branch. It is composed of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the chief judge of each
judicial circuit, and a district judge from each judicial circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982).
89. Pelham, supra note 87; Bar Groups Oppose Biden Bill, THIRD BRANCH, May
1990, at 5.
90. Judges Address Civil Reform and Judgeship Needs, THIRD BRANCH, July 1990, at
1-2; Judicial Conference Approves Plan to Improve Civil Case Management, THIRD
BRANCH, May 1990, at 1-3 (The Judicial Conference plan provided for each trial court to
"form an advisory group to study and recommend improvements in case management."
91. Hearings, supra note 10, at 319, 333 (statement by the Honorable Robert
Peckham). Senator Biden was particularly bitter about the failure of the judges' organization
to support the legislation, as well as suggestions that he was trading judgeships (included in
Title II of the legislation) for support for the more controversial Title I. See id. at 394-95
(Senator Biden). See also Mark Ballard, Bill to Add U.S. Judges Shortchanges Texas by 6,
TEX. LAW., June 18, 1990, at 4 (quoting Judge Aubrey Robinson that the "patronage move
[on judgeships] is designed to drum up support for an unpopular part" of the bill).
92. Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans, Pub. L. 101-650, §§ 471-482,
104 Stat. 5090 (1990) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482).
93. Id. at § 471 (plans); id. at § 478 (advisory groups).
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and decisions on motions, and use of alternative dispute resolution." The
legislation also provides for a 10-district pilot program, in which the
provisions for expense and delay reduction are mandatory rather than
advisory?9 Moreover, the recommendation that records concerning the
state of individual judges' dockets be made public, which was strongly
opposed by the judges, was adopted.6 To date, $25 million has been
authorized to implement the act."
Senator Biden opened the hearings on the legislation by invoking
the little guy, the "middle class [that] has been almost priced out of the
civil litigation market. "" But the story of the individual's experience in
the civil justice system remains to be told. The crisis story being told in
Justice for All, when all is said and done, is the story of the corporate
client: everything costs too much and takes too long, and it is the
lawyers' (and judges') fault. The testimony at the initial hearings in
support of the legislation was, for the most part, from two witnesses who
represented corporate clients. 9 As noted earlier, the task force itself was
dominated by corporate counsel and financially underwritten in part by
Aetna, whose advertising in support of its view that the civil litigation
system is "berserk" is legendary.' e  Senator Biden is, of course, the
senator from Delaware, home to hundreds of corporations.
What is the target of the corporate counsel? As is by now
obvious, the answer is discovery. In testimony in support of legislation,
corporate counsel consistently stated that the problem they thought the
legislation combatted was "wide open discovery," a policy choice of the
drafters of the Federal Rules with which they disagree.' O' Thus, many of
94. Id. at § 473 (content of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans).
95. Id. at § 105.
96. Id. at § 476 (enhancement of judicial information dissemination). Under the Act,
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts is ordered to prepare a
report listing the number of motions that have been pending for six months and the namie of
the cases in which the motions are pending, the number and names of bench trials that have
been submitted for more than six months, and the number and names of cases that have not
been terminated within three years of filing. Id.
97. Id. at § 106.
98. Hearings, supra note 10, at 1.
99. See id. at 10-28 (statement of Patrick Head, Vice President and General Counsel of
FMC Corporation) (Mr. Head also served on the task force as a representative of Business
Roundtable, a group of large corporations, id. at 8); id. at 47-58 (testimony and prepared
statement of Stephen Middlebrook, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Aetna Life
and Casualty).
100. See supra note 11.
101. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 10, at 384 (testimony of Carl Liggio on behalf of
American Corporate Counsel Association ("The root problem is that with the advent of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we adopted a policy of wide open discovery."); id. at 14
(statement of Patrick Head, Vice President and General Counsel of FMC Corporation) ('I
see little in the Federal Rules... that on balance helps defendants.")
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the recommendations might be seen as a way to avoid policy choices that
are viewed as benefitting the "have nots" at the (unjustified) expense of
the "haves. "Il This is, of course, an enormously controversial agenda,
and one that was addressed explicitly in the 1983 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As the Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on the rules noted at the time, the 1983 amended rules became
effective "by the thinnest hair you can think of,"l0 recounting the "very
strong attempt by organized segments of the bar (particularly the defense
bar) to change the pleading structure and the discovery structure, with an
idea of achieving early issue formulation. ,04 The defense bar, of course,
views early issue formulation and discovery limits as substantive gains,
likely to result in fewer settlements and fewer victories for plaintiffs.
The current Federal Rules reflect instead a more balanced
approach, penalizing attorneys who engage in redundant or
disproportionate discovery while largely leaving attorneys to assess the
needs of their clients for themselves.05 It is telling, in fact, that the task
force report dismisses as "tinkering" the amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16(b), which requires individualized setting of deadlines
in all of the areas discussed by the report.'TM
The task force repackaged the earlier attack on the Federal Rules
as an attack on poor judicial case management, all in the service of access
to "justice for all." However, the goals of the report - early issue
foreclosure and discovery limits - mimic the earlier, defeated efforts to
amend the Federal Rules more drastically to accomplish those things the
report now advocates.
Thus, the Biden Bill fulfilled a variety 9f political needs, none of
them very seriously tied to cost and delay reduction. First, it met the
needs of a powerful senator, up for reelection, to perform a service for an
equally-powerful constituency. Second, it did so in a way that could be
sold as providing a public good (access to litigation services for the
middle-class) by using buzz words (cost and delay reduction) that are
102. Discovery activity is most frequent in torts cases. KRITZER, supra note 47, at
101. To the extent torts cases involve repeat players like insurance companies as defendants
against one-shot litigants as plaintiffs, the legislation represents just another validation of
Galanter's famous thesis, with the arena simply moved from litigation to legislation. Marc
Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Lidits of Legal Change, 9
LAw & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974) (repeat players more likely to play for rules).
103. MILLER, supra note 28, at 1.
104. Id. at 24.
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (sanctions for excessive discovery); see also MILLER, supra
note 28, at 30-36 (stating that there is little evidence of widespread discovery abuse and
noting wryly that discovery abuse is "quite simply . . . what your opponent is doing to
you.").
106. REPORT, supra note 3, at 9.
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politically noncontroversial. As I have noted, its proposals are consistent
less with the underlying reality of civil litigation in the federal courts than
with the ideologies of its primary lobbyists, those representing corporate
clients who are frequent defendants in the federal courts. Corporations
are important constituents for Senator Biden, and they believe that the
terms of the legislation work to their advantage. Senator Biden was able
to point to the success of a piece of legislation attacking a set of
"problems" - cost and delay - that are completely uncontroversial.
Thus, he could communicate concern in a vague way with the problems of
the average citizen, while deploring waste in government and by
lawyers.' 7  Given this set of factors, not even the opposition of the
federal bench could result in derailing the bill."
I1. A COMPARISON CRISIS: THE REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
The Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC) was created by
Congress to "examine problems and issues currently facing the courts of
the United States," and "develop a long range plan for the future of the
107. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tar Legislation in the 1980's, 139 U. PENN. L. REv. 1,
79 (1990) (noting that voter behavior might be influenced by "affection for the politician
who appears to be a 'regular person' and to understand and share one's values (or to have
attractive values of her own).").
108. In fact, the opposition of the judiciary enraged Biden. See Hearings, supra note
10, at 393-96 (remarks of Sen. Biden). See also S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-
6 part H.D. ("Negotiations with and Involvement of The Judicial Conference of the United
States"). This opposition was probably responsible for the changes the Senate Judiciary
Committee made in the Judicial Conference's recommendations for increases in the numbers
of judges. Id. at 33-34. Biden stated in the hearings on Title H, which authorized the
creation of 77 new judgeships, "We have taken the recommendations [of the Judicial
Conference] seriously, as the Judiciary Committee has always done. But in the end, . . . the
Judicial Conference's recommendations are just that - recommendations - nothing more,
nothing less." 136 CONG. REc. S6473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990). Senator Biden added, "I
know of no other part of the Federal Government where regional agencies call national
headquarters, ask for a multi-million dollar commitment of resources, and then are given by
the Congress exactly what they want, no questions asked." Hearings, supra note 10, at 309.
Most of this anger was the result of suggestions by some judges that Biden was tradingjudgeships for support, a theme to which Biden returned repeatedly during the June 26, 1990
Hearings. See Hearings, supra note 10. In again denying that this was so, Biden said, "As
I think it is fair to say, the chairman of the committee, the Senator from Delaware, could
have added two judges to Delaware and who would have made a case against it? But there
are no new judges in Delaware." Hearings, supra note 10, at 393.
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federal judiciary."°9 The Committee, as part of the Judicial Conference,
was instructed to assess, among other things, alternative methods of
dispute resolution, methods of resolving intracircuit and intercircuit
conflicts, and the types of disputes resolved in the federal courts 0  In
contrast to the task force membership, six of the fifteen committee
members were judges and four were members of the House and Senate
Judiciary Committees. The Committee chair, Judge Weis, stated his
commitment to soliciting a broad spectrum of views.' Thus, the
Committee appeared well-positioned to effect major reform, were it so
inclined, in the federal courts. To date, however, only the Committee's
least controversial proposals have been enacted." 2
The FCSC report is 188 pages long, and supported by three
volumes of additional materials. It is a fascinating compendium of
suggestions, philosophical musings,"3 and arguments. Like the task force
report, it is premised on the existence of a crisis in the federal courts, or
at least an "impending crisis."" 4 Unlike the task force recommendations,
however, the FCSC recommendations for the most part need no "crisis"
justification. Many of the recommendations, such as the suggestion that
pendent jurisdiction doctrines be codified, or federal statutes of limitation
adopted, are independently justified as sound judicial administration and
are relatively uncontroversial." 5 To what end, then, is the existence of a
crisis invoked in the FCSC report? And whose crisis is it?
109. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat.
4642 (1988). See Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Courts Study Committee Begins Its
Work, 21 ST. MARY'S L. J. 15 (1989). Judge Weis chaired the Committee, whose
membership included, in addition to the judges, Senators Howell Heflin and Charles
Grassley of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Representatives Robert Kastenmeier and
Carol Moorehead of the House Judiciary Committee.
110. Weis, supra note 109.
111. Id. at 16.
112. 136 CONG. REC. H8262 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (remarks of Rep. Kastemneier)
("noncontroversial recommendations"); 136 CONG. REC. S17578 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990)
(remarks of Sen. Grassley) (legislation represents "only those consensus items that enjoyed
unanimous support"). Justice Rehnquist reports that some of the Committee's proposals
have been implemented "through administrative action of the Judicial Conference." William
H. Rehnquist, 1990 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1991,
at 1-2. Senator Heflin has introduced new legislation to implement some of the FCSC
proposals. See Senator Howell Heflin: A Champion of COurt Reform on Capitol Hill,
THIRD BRANCH, Oct. 1990, at 10.
113. After several pages making the case for viewing the federal courts as in "crisis,"
the FCSC report asks (rhetorically), "What is to be done?". It then expresses a preference
for incremental rather than radical reform, supporting its preference with Edmund Burke and
Thomas Jefferson, two renowned court watchers. FCSC, supra note 5, at 9.
114. FCSC, supra note 5, at 4.
115. See George D. Brown, Nonideological Judicial Reform and Its Limits - The
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, 47 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 973, 994
(1990) (regretting that the FCSC report avoided "ideological issues concerning the federal
courts," especially those concerning federal jurisdiction).
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A. The Crisis Part II: The Deteriorating Bench
The crisis described by the FCSC is a subtly different one from
the crisis described in Justice for All. The FCSC report describes a
trebling of the caseload in the federal trial courts between 1958 and 1988,
a phenomenon whose cause, the report states, is "not fully understood but
certainly include[s] the continued growth of federal law and in particular
the creation of many new federal rights both by Congress and by judicial
interpretation of the Constitution, and a variety of procedural
developments such as expanded use of class actions and 'one-way'
shifting of attorneys' fees." 116 As a result of the caseload increase, which
has been recently exacerbated by increased filings caused by the war on
drugs, judges are beginning to fall behind. Unlike the task force, the
FCSC provides some documentation for this claim: "whereas in 1960 it
would have taken the district courts only nine months to dispose of all
their pending cases . . . at their then rate of terminations, by 1989 this
figure had risen to 11.7 months. "n7 A slip of 2.7 months in nearly 30
years might not strike many people as a disaster (esp5ecially since, as
noted above, the median time for dispositions is still not great). Nor is an
increase in the number of cases in the federal courts, in and of itself,
necessarily a cause for alarm. If, as the FCSC speculates, the increase is
due to congressional expansion of causes of action, then it represents a
series of political choices that can be debated on their own merits. The
selective catalogue above - congressional creation of causes of action,
judicial activism, fee-shifting statutes (of which the most obvious is 42
U.S.C. section 1988, providing for attorneys' fees to successful civil
rights plaintiffs) and class actions (which have been declining over
time) - betrays an ideological bias. Other obvious but unmentioned
causes of caseload stresses are executive branch decisions, such as the
Social Security Administration's decisions in the 1980's to drop thousands
of people from the disability rolls."
However, if the "long-expected crisis in the federal courts . . . is
at last upon us," and if the crisis consists of an increase in case filings,
one might expect an argument for increasing the number of judges, either
because the increase is affecting the amount of time it takes to get a
116. FCSC, supra note 5, at 5. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985) for a similar description of the crisis. Judge Posner
was a member of the FCSC.
117. FCSC, supra note 5, at 6.
118. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Social Security Disability Determinations:
Recommendations for Reform, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 484-506 (1990). See generally
Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 371 (1990).
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decision, or because it is affecting the quality of the decisions, or the
judges' job satisfaction." 9
Here the FCSC makes a controversial argument, suggesting an
increase in federal judges as a short-term solution, but disfavoring
increasing the number of judges in the future as a long-term solution in
favor of reducing the number of cases allowed in federal court. What
supports a limitation on the adjudicative capacity of the federal courts?
The FCSC makes the following argument:
The independence secured to federal judges through Article III is
compatible with responsible and efficient performance of judicial
duties only if federal judges are carefully selected from a pool of
competent and eager applicants and only if they are sufficiently
few in number to feel a personal stake in the consequences of
their actions. Neither condition can be satisfied if there are
thousands of federal judges.'
The report argues that without a significant increase in salaries, it
would be impossible to attract a large number of such qualified applicants
in any event. Nor would it be wise to increase the federal judiciary
much, because such an increase could only lead to difficulties in
coordinating the federal judicial system, and an increase in intercircuit
conflicts. And, the report warns, respect for federal judges will erode
unless "the federal judiciary is perceived as a small and special corps of
men and women whose talents are reserved for issues that transcend local
concern, rather than as a faceless, omnipresent bureaucracy.
" 121
In addition to these reasons for not adding federal judges, the
report suggests another: the courts are approaching "the limits of [their]
natural growth."'2 While the federal bench is really quite tiny given our
119. On the effect of caseload on the judges' reported job satisfaction, see Robel, supra
note 14, at 38-40.
120. FCSC, supra note 5, at 7.
121. Id.
122. FCSC, supra note 5, at 8. In testimony before the Federal Courts Study
Committee, Judith Resnik notes,
IT]he peculiarity of the views [that the federal courts have "natural" limits
that have been reached] may best be illustrated by considering comparable
arguments made about the other branches of the federal government. For
example, imagine someone objecting to the transformation of one of the
federal territories, such as Puerto Rico, into a state on the grounds that no
more states can be admitted to the union because Congress has reached its
'natural size.' . . . [The appropriate response would be that one does not
begin an analysis by stipulating the absolute size of a branch of the federal
government, but rather that one begins by considering the responsibilities
that the branch must serve, and then one thinks about the optimal size.
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population, or in comparison to the number of judges in some of the more
populous states,'n the report suggests that the ceiling might be reached at
1000.m
Finally, the report argues, an expansion in the number of judges
"is likely to come at the expense of the states, and thus to impair the
fundamental constitutional concept of limited federal government.
Keeping the federal judiciary relatively small increases the likelihood that
federal intervention will be limited to those situations in which it is most
clearly necessary." s
The FCSC suggests, then, that not enough qualified and interested
applicants for positions on the federal bench exist to support an increase
in the number of federal judges to meet the caseload, and that if they did
exist, it would still be a bad idea to increase the federal bench for both
political and ideological reasons. As to the first of these arguments, the
FCSC does not present any evidence that judges are becoming more
difficult to recruit, that the pool of potential judges is in fact a tiny one,
or that an increase in judges would lead current judges to abandon the
bench in despair.2 As to the second, agreement with the report's
conclusions requires adherence to a vision of the federal courts that is
enormously controversial, one that views the federal courts as disfavored
institutions of last resort ("federal intervention will be limited to those
situations in which it is most clearly necessary), u2 at odds with tenets of
federalism (expansion "is likely to come at the expense of the states"). m
Hearings of the Federal Courts Study Committee, Jan. 29, 1990, San Diego, Cal. (testimony
of Judith Resnik) (on file with author).
123. The total number for federal judges at the time of the report was around 750.
FCSC, supra note 5, at 8. Judith Resnik, in noting the oddity of this section of the FCSC,
compares the number of state court judges: 769 state court judges sit on intermediate
appellate courts, 6204 sit in courts that have appellate and original jurisdiction, and another
12,929 are trial judges. Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work
in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 936 (1990). See also DANIEL J. MEADOR,
AMERICAN COURTS 35 (1991) (noting that the number of trial judges in California is greater
than the total number of federal trial judges).
124. FCSC, supra note 5, at 8.
125. Id.
126. Robel, supra note 14, at 38-40. When asked whether they would take the job
again if it were offered to them, 14 appellate judges said they would not, compared to 48
judges who would "jump at the opportunity" and 89 who would "give the matter careful
thought." Id. at 40. Moreover, judges themselves were split on the question of whether an
increase in caseload should be addressed through adding judges: 52% of the respondents
would add judges to meet additional caseload. Id. at 41 n.153.
127. FCSC, supra note 5, at 8 (emphasis added).
128. Id. This vision of the federal courts parallels the one expressed by one of the
FCSC subcommittee chairs, Judge Richard Posner, in his book THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM (1985). For an insightful review of this book's crisis claims, see Jack
M. Beermann, Crisis? What Crisis?, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1383 (1987).
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B. Whose Crisis is This?
By eliminating the option of increasing adjudicative capacity to
keep up with demand at the outset, the FCSC is able to support a variety
of recommendations that would drastically curtail access to federal courts,
from new exhaustion of remedies requirements for prisoner civil rights
plaintiffsP to severely restricted access in social security cases, m to
amount in controversy restrictions on Federal Tort Claim Act cases.'3' As
it turns out, these are the kinds of low-status, low-resources types of cases
that judges often view as tedious and professionally uninteresting m
Thus, the FCSC transformed a "crisis" - increased caseload - into a
brief for a vision of the federal courts that protects, first, the prestige of
the judges' positions by artificially keeping the numbers of those judges
down, and second, the judges' ability to preserve their status by work on
the high-stakes, high-prestige cases on which reputations are built.' The
crisis developed in the FCSC report, then, is a judges' crisis, and the
solutions the report offers are consistent less with a concept of just
resource allocation within the federal courts than with a view of what
would enhance the professional satisfaction and prestige of judges.
I do not mean by this discussion to suggest that the FCSC report
does not contain worthwhile and interesting recommendations." 4 Rather, I
intend only to question the report's creation and assessment of yet another
court crisis. As with Justice for All, The Report of the Federal Courts
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THE POLITICS OF CRISIS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Study Committee uses crisis rhetoric to advance the interests of a group of
court insiders by masking the controversial and making it appear
inevitable, simply a necessary result of a disturbing "crisis" that threatens
to overwhelm the courts.
Ill. CONCLUSION
We need the federal courts. We file around 300,000 lawsuits in
them every year.es We depend on them for the vindication of a variety of
federal interests. Access to them has a symbolic resonance, and
arguments that it should be more difficult for certain classes of plaintiffs
to prove their lawsuits, or that some plaintiffs should be booted out
altogether, are always controversial.
Both Justice for All and The Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee recognize the controversy that attends such arguments. They
attempt to circumvent the controversy by couching proposals that do just
that in crisis rhetoric, implicitly arguing that the things we cherish about
the federal courts are threatened without agreement with their views.
Upon close scrutiny, however, the crisis is chimerical, the solutions
unnecessary, or their necessity unproven.
Evoking crisis is a standard political ploy, one familiar to every
politician!' However, the existence of a crisis of some sort in the
federal courts has reached a level of acceptance that makes dissent seem
almost eccentric.37 My hope in this article is to demonstrate that such
claims always deserve close scrutiny, for it is our very dependence upon
and respect for the federal courts that makes crisis rhetoric tempting.
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